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BUSINESS ELECTRONICS CORP. V. SHARP
ELECTRONICS CORP.: MONSANTO'S PROGENY
AND THE CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSAL TO
CODIFY THE PER SE RULE AGAINST
VERTICAL PRICE FIXING
Antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors.' Protection of vigor-
ous price competition as a means of promoting consumer welfare2 and eco-
nomic efficiency has always been at the heart of this maxim. Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act proscribes attempts to unreasonably interfere with
the free-market forces that determine prices.3 In 1911, the United States
Supreme Court first established that vertical price fixing was just such an
unreasonable restraint of trade.4 Although Congress permitted a "fair
trade" exemption to the Sherman Act for a time,5 in the ensuing seventy-
eight years the Court reaffirmed the per se proscription against vertical price
fixing in every case in which the issue arose.6 Recently, however, the execu-
tive and judicial branches of the Federal Government have challenged this
absolute proscription against vertical price fixing as potentially creating mar-
ket imperfections and discouraging efficient economic behavior.7
Theorists from the "Chicago School" of antitrust law propounded an
1. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
2. Recognizing that the primary purpose of antitrust law is the promotion of consumer
welfare, the United States Supreme Court has called the Sherman Antitrust Act a "consumer
welfare prescription." NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (quoting Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)).
3. Sherman Antitrust Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)). Section 1 prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations." Id. § 1.
4. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The Court
did not actually use the phrase "illegal per se" in Dr. Miles. One of the first cases to hold that
price fixing was illegal per se was United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,223
(1940).
5. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988); Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948),
overruled on other grounds, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S.
85 (1920).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 101-49.
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"efficiency" theory that urges the elimination of the per se rule because verti-
cal price fixing may promote efficiency and competition.8 The Chicago
School9 conflicts with traditional antitrust theory, which supports per se
prohibitions against vertical price fixing and advocates the view that reason-
able and vigorous price competition is more economically efficient and bene-
ficial.'" The Chicago School's efficiency theory, however, has gained
acceptance in modern legal circles 1 and has created a movement to overturn
the precedent establishing vertical price fixing as illegal per se.
The efficiency theories of the Chicago School gained powerful proponents
in the Reagan administration.' 2 Despite empirical studies indicating the ad-
verse economic effects of vertical price fixing, 3 the Reagan administration
8. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept. Price Fixing and
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966). Under this theory, increases in output promote
efficiency and competition. Id. at 403-05. Price restraints imposed on a distributor by a manu-
facturer promote efficiency and competition because the manufacturer's goal is to increase
output, not prices. Id. Manufacturers would not want to impose price restraints unless they
were output enhancing. Id. Therefore, vertical price restraints are procompetitive and effi-
cient. The manufacturer establishes a price or price level that induces a distributor to provide
customer services, such as advertising, promotion, repair, and credit services, that the manu-
facturer has determined the customer wants, and that will persuade more customers to
purchase the product. Id. at 429, 453-61. If the convenience that the customer realizes from
these services more than offsets the utility the customer loses from the increase in the product's
price, demand and output rise. If the utility from the services is less, the manufacturer adjusts
the price and/or the level and quality of services to maintain output. Id. at 473; see also R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); Baxter, Vertical Restraints and Resale Price Main-
tenance: A 'Rule-of-Reason' Approach, 14 ANTITRUST L. & EcON. REV. 13 (Issue 4, 1982);
Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
9. This school is also sometimes called the "consumer welfare" school after the theories
developed by former Judge Robert Bork in his book The Antitrust Paradox. See R. BORK,
supra note 8. As one commentator has noted, this terminology is misleading because the effect
of these policies may actually result in the transfer of wealth from the consumer to the retailers
and manufacturers, leaving the consumer economically disadvantaged. See Gerla, infra note
98, at 3 n.10; see also H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 2.3
(1985).
10. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at § 1.1. The traditional study of economics teaches
that businesses unable to compete on a price basis succumb to more efficient rivals. Id. The
consumer benefits from lower prices and higher quality products; the manufacturer realizes
economies of scale and higher profits from increased output; and the economy benefits from a
more efficient allocation of economic resources. Id. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
and antitrust laws in general are designed to protect against contracts, combinations, or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade formed for the purpose and with the effect of frustrating this
result. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
11. See sources cited supra note 8.
12. See, e.g., ANTITRUST DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VERTI-
CAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES (1985) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]; see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 119-31.
13. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1569, 1571-72 (citing a 1969 Economic Report of the President indicating
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used the efficiency theory to defend its attempt to overturn the absolute pro-
scription against this type of conduct.14 Two developments evidenced the
administration's effort to eliminate or limit the application of the per se stan-
dard. First, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) established a
policy to intervene on behalf of defendants in private vertical price fixing
actions.' 5 Second, the DOJ effectively abdicated responsibility for govern-
ment enforcement of the vertical price fixing laws' 6 by ignoring or distin-
guishing the per se rule.'7
The judiciary's view of vertical restraints also took on a decidedly Chicago
School flavor. The Supreme Court's decision in Continental T V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 1 which applied the rule of reason to vertical nonprice
restraints, evidenced the efficiency theory's impact on the legal treatment of
vertical restraints.' 9 Seven years later, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp.,20 the Court relied on the efficiency rationale enunciated in Sylvania2'
that the prices of goods were 18 to 27 percent higher under the fair trade laws and that con-
sumers could save $1.2 billion a year, $2.1 billion adjusted for inflation, by eliminating the fair
trade laws); Brief Amicus Curiae of Dayton Hudson Corp. for Petitioner at 14-17, Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914) (citing studies showing resale
price maintenance's pernicious effect on prices, innovation and new businesses); see also Retail
Competition Enforcement Act, 1987: Hearings on S. 430, A Bill to Amend the Sherman Act
Regarding Retail Competition, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1987) (statement of Mr. Monroe G. Milstein, President of the
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., citing a 1975 Justice Department study) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings]; id. at 69.
14. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914) [hereinafter Brief];
GUIDELINES, supra note 12; see also infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
15. H.R. REP. No. 421, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987).
16. S. REP. No. 280, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1987). The existence of this policy is
evidenced by the fact that the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) had not brought a
single vertical price fixing action since 1981. Id.
17. Id. at 4-5.
18. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
19. Id. at 58-59. In Sylvania, the Court overruled the per se standard for vertical nonprice
restraints established ten years earlier in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967). Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59. The Sylvania Court established a presumption for appli-
cation of the rule of reason standard, departure from which the Court held "must be based on
demonstrable economic effect rather than ... upon formalistic line drawing." Id. at 59. The
Court's holding focused primarily on the "substantial scholarly and judicial authority support-
ing [the] economic utility" of vertical restraints. Id. at 57-58. Noting the potential procompe-
titive and efficiency-enhancing benefits of vertical restraints, the Court found that vertical
restraints lack the pernicious effects on competition required of unreasonable restraints of
trade. Id. at 54-58.
20. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
21. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-56. The Court also based its holding on the views advocated
by the DOJ in an amicus brief filed on behalf of Monsanto. See Brief, supra note 14. The
amicus brief advocated the elimination of the per se standard for vertical price fixing as incon-
sistent with the Court's decision in Sylvania and the requirement of proof of an explicit agree-
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to narrow the breadth of the absolute prohibition against vertical price fixing
by imposing a greater burden of proof on plaintiffs.22 This new evidentiary
standard raised questions about the quantum of proof needed to prove a
violation of the rule against vertical price fixing and consequently created
confusion in the lower courts.2 3 Four years later, Business Electronics Corp.
v. Sharp Electronics Corp.24 answered the question as to what quantum of
evidence satisfied the Monsanto evidentiary standard.
Sharp Electronics Corporation (Sharp), a manufacturer of electronic
products, granted Business Electronics Corporation (BEC), a discount re-
tailer of electronic products, the sole Sharp dealership in the Houston area in
1968.25 After disagreements between Sharp and BEC over sales quotas and
discounting, Sharp granted a second dealership in the Houston area to Hart-
well.2 6 Upset about BEC's discounting and alleged "free riding' 27 practices,
Hartwell approached BEC in an effort to convince BEC to end these prac-
tices and also complained to Sharp.2" With no resolution forthcoming,
Hartwell presented an ultimatum to Sharp in June 1973 threatening to end
their relationship unless Sharp terminated BEC.2 9 Sharp did so,30 and BEC
brought suit alleging that Sharp and Hartwell had conspired to terminate
BEC in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3'
Sharp contended that it terminated BEC because of poor sales perform-
ance.3 2 BEC countered that its termination resulted from an agreement be-
ment on prices or price levels for application of the per se rule. Id. at 7-12, 19-29. The Court
rejected the DOJ's suggestion to overturn the per se standard, but did adopt the more stringent
standard of proof. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7, 764 (1984).
22. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764. In Monsanto, the plaintiff argued and the lower courts
held that the termination of a dealer following or in response to a competing dealer's com-
plaint about price cutting was illegal per se as a combination or conspiracy to fix prices. Id. at
757-59. The Court, however, refused to permit the inference of an agreement based on a termi-
nation following or in response to a competitor's complaints. Instead, the Court required the
plaintiff to present evidence that excluded the possibility of independent action by the manu-
facturer. Id. at 764. The Court described the standard of evidence required to prove a con-
spiracy to fix prices as evidence that "tends to prove . .. 'a conscious commitment to a
common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.' " Id. (citing Edward J. Sweeney
& Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911
(1981)).
23. S. REP. No. 280, supra note 16, at 4.
24. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
25. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1986).
26. Id. at 1215.
27. See infra note 228.
28. 780 F.2d at 1215.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1214.
32. Id. at 1215.
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tween Sharp and Hartwell to eliminate price competition.33 The case went
to the jury with instructions that BEC's termination would violate section 1
of the Sherman Act if Sharp and Hartwell had agreed to terminate BEC
because of its price cutting policy.3 4 The jury found in favor of BEC.35
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed and remanded.36 The Fifth Circuit found error in the trial court's
jury instruction that a finding of an agreement between Sharp and Hartwell
to terminate BEC for its price cutting established a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. 37 Holding that a manufacturer's termination of a dealer
would be per se illegal only if effected pursuant to a price maintenance agree-
ment with another dealer,38 the court of appeals concluded that the evidence
might be sufficient to find that Sharp terminated BEC pursuant to such a
price agreement, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion.3 9 However, in a short concurring opinion, one of the cir-
cuit judges invited the United States Supreme Court to address the confusing
and. uncertain area of vertical restraints.' When BEC appealed, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari."
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision, holding that a
vertical restraint of trade was not a per se violation under section 1 of the
Sherman Act unless it included an agreement on prices or price levels.42
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that vertical restraints may
promote economic efficiency and competition,43 and concluded that eco-
nomic analysis supported the view that the appropriate standard for non-
price restraints was the rule of reason." The Court again used the theoreti-
cal efficiencies and procompetitive benefits of vertical restraints to narrow
the absolute prohibition against vertical price fixing.45 The Court would not
33. Id. Evidence indicated that Hartwell usually complied with Sharp's suggested resale
price list, and that both Hartwell and Sharp had attempted to obtain compliance with the price
list from Business Electronics Corporation (BEC). Id. at 1219, In addition, BEC presented
evidence that it was not "free riding," that its sales performance was equal to Hartwell's, and
that BEC's termination was in response to Hartwell's complaints and ultimatum. Id.
34. Id. at 1215.
35. Id. at 1214.
36. Id. at 1220.
37. Id. at 1215.
38. Id. at 1218.
39. Id. at 1219-20.
40. Id. at 1221-22.
41. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 482 U.S. 912 (1987).
42. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1525 (1988). Justice
Stevens and Justice White dissented. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision.
43. Id. at 1519-20.
44. Id. at 1517, 1525.
45. Id. at 1519-20.
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permit a jury to infer a vertical price fixing agreement merely from a dealer's
termination following the complaints of a competing dealer.4 6 Instead, the
Court held that the plaintiff must present sufficient direct or circumstantial
evidence to prove the existence of an explicit price agreement between the
manufacturer and the complaining dealer.4 7
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, objected to the majority's mischaracter-
ization of the restraint as a nonprice restraint.48 He noted that the major-
ity's decision attached more weight to the mere theoretical possibilities of
economic and competitive benefits than to the real economic impact of this
restraint on price competition.4 9 Justice Stevens contended that such dealer
terminations were more appropriately characterized as boycotts and, there-
fore, naked price-based restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.
50
Congress has reacted vigorously to the challenge to the per se rule and has
taken various actions to prevent the erosion of the absolute prohibitions
against vertical price fixing.5 Nevertheless, executive and judicial efforts to
overturn or weaken the per se protections against vertical price fixing have
succeeded.
This Note examines the development of antitrust law with respect to verti-
cal restraints and the conflict between the judicial, executive, and legislative
branches over the per se prohibition against vertical price fixing. It empha-
sizes the Supreme Court cases narrowing the per se standard applicable to
vertical price restraints. Next, the Note focuses on the Justice Department's
efforts to undermine private vertical price fixing actions and its failure to
enforce the prohibitions against vertical price fixing under the Sherman Act.
Against this background, the Note discusses the Sharp decision and its con-
tribution to the gradual demise of the per se standard. The Note then criti-
cally analyzes the procompetitive and efficiency-enhancing benefits of
vertical price fixing that the DOJ and the Supreme Court have advocated as
a basis for narrowing or eliminating the per se standard. It then attempts to
project the legal and economic impact of the Sharp decision. The Note re-
views the actions that Congress is considering to turn back the assault on the
per se standard. Finally, the Note concludes that Congress must codify the
46. Id. at 1520-21.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1526 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1536.
50. Id. at 1531-32. Justice Stevens characterized the restraint as a horizontal restraint of
trade; that is, a restraint of trade at the same level in the distribution system rather than a
vertical restraint, which affects different levels in the distribution system. Id. at 1526; see infra
note 54.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 156-72.
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per se prohibition against vertical price fixing and restore the plaintiff's right
to a jury trial where the plaintiff presents evidence sufficient to infer a price
fixing conspiracy.
I. FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
CONTROVERSY
Every contract and every business relationship involves a restraint of
trade.52 The Supreme Court has construed the Sherman Act, however, as
proscribing only unreasonable restraints of trade.53 Restraints of trade are
classified as either horizontal54 or vertical.55 Vertical restraints, both price
and nonprice, primarily affect intrabrand competition which is defined as
competition among sellers of the same manufacturer's product.5 6 Vertical
price restraints, commonly known as resale price maintenance agreements,
52. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
53. Id. The Sherman Antitrust Act states that "(e)very contract, combination . . . is
hereby declared to be illegal," and indeed, in early judicial interpretations of the Act, the
proscription was literally construed to include what are today considered reasonable restraints.
See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), overruled sub nom.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). In United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), the Court recognized the reasonableness standard for restraints of
trade:
The essence of the law is injury to the public. It is not every restraint of competition
and not every restraint of trade that works an injury to the public; it is only an undue
and unreasonable restraint of trade that has such an effect and is deemed to be
unlawful.
Id. at 395. (emphasis added).
54. ANTITRUST SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 28-
55 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS]. A horizontal restraint is an agreement, either
express or implied, among competitors of the same or similar product at the same level in the
production-distribution system that affects the competitive relationship of the parties. Id. It
may include, for example, an agreement as to prices, product, territories, or services. Id.
Among the practices that have been deemed illegal per se are price fixing, United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); cornering the market in a product, id. at 150;
group boycotts, Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); division of
markets, United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); and fixing uniform cus-
tomer discounts or credit terms, Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980). This
Note will deal exclusively with vertical restraints.
55. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, § 9.1. Vertical restraints are agreements between man-
ufacturers and their dealers that restrict the freedom of dealers to market the product. Id.
Typical vertical restrictions imposed on the dealer include resale price maintenance (vertical
price fixing), location and customer restrictions, and exclusive dealing and tying arrangements.
Id. §§ 8.1, 9.1; see also DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 54, at 55-108. Among the vertical prac-
tices that have been deemed to be illegal per se are vertical price fixing, Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); and tying arrangements, International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
56. See supra note 55. In contrast, horizontal restraints affect interbrand competition:
competition among the sellers of the same or similar product of different manufacturers. See
supra note 54.
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are agreements between manufacturers and dealers to fix the prices at which
the dealer will resell the manufacturer's product.57 Manufacturers impose
vertical nonprice restraints to control the marketing and sale of the prod-
uct.58 Under current law, vertical restraints are subject to one of two stan-
dards: a per se rule or the rule of reason.
A per se rule of illegality is generally a conclusive presumption that a
restraint is unreasonable.5 9 Courts apply the standard to conduct deemed to
have a "pernicious" effect on competition,6 ° that is, conduct that "almost
always results in adverse competitive effects, and almost never is justified by
business reasons.", 6' The use of "almost" implies that the conduct may have
procompetitive effects, but that collateral anticompetitive effects almost al-
ways outweigh these effects. The rationale for applying a per se rule is that it
provides a "bright line" standard for the business and legal communities and
results in administrative efficiency by deeming certain conduct illegal per se
without proof of actual anticompetitive effects or injury.62
A rule of reason standard, on the other hand, recognizes that certain re-
strictive conduct may promote economic efficiency or competition and at-
tempts to balance these benefits against the potential anticompetitive effects
of the conduct in order to determine whether the conduct is unreasonable.
63
The test, articulated by Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade of Chicago v.
57. 7 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, 11437 (1986).
58. See supra note 55. Territorial and customer restrictions, exclusive dealership arrange-
ments, and tying arrangements are the most common types of vertical nonprice restraints. Id.
59. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
60. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Court defined those
practices to which a per se standard should apply. The Court stated:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unrea-
sonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sher-
man Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the
necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into
the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry
so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Id.; see also United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (defining the rationale of the per se standard).
61. Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case. Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1978).
62. See Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 343-44. Antitrust litigation is extremely complex,
expensive, and time-consuming. Id. Judicial and business efficiencies are realized by avoiding
the long, complex, and expensive trials required in rule of reason actions. Id. Thus, when a
per se rule is applied, the judicial system and the business environment benefit from a relatively
clear and concise statement of the conduct proscribed by the Sherman Act. Id.
63. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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United States,6" requires a determination of whether the restraint merely
regulates and thereby promotes competition, or whether it suppresses or de-
stroys competition.6 5 The typical rule of reason case requires a complex and
time-consuming examination of the specific conduct, the product and geo-
graphic markets, the adverse and beneficial impact of this conduct on those
markets, and the motives and justifications for the conduct.6 6 Restraints
that are not illegal per se are subjected to the rule of reason standard. A rule
of reason action can be an extremely expensive process and is often difficult
for a plaintiff to win. A per se standard avoids this costly fact-finding pro-
cess because it requires proof only of the existence of the conduct.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS LAW
A. Vertical Price Restraints and the Sherman Act
In 1911, the Supreme Court established the illegality of vertical price fix-
ing in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.67 Dr. Miles, a
manufacturer of proprietary medicines, required each wholesale and retail
seller of its products to enter into a consignment or agency contract that
fixed the prices at which the dealer could resell Dr. Miles' products. 68 Dr.
Miles alleged that the defendant, a wholesaler, had obtained the company's
products from Dr. Miles' agents and had sold them at less than the contrac-
tually set minimum prices. 69 Noting that agreements having no other pur-
pose than to restrain competition and fix prices were injurious to the
public,70 the Court held the plaintiff's consignment contract invalid both at
common law and under the Sherman Act.7'
64. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
65. Id. at 238. Justice Brandeis described the test as follows:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.
Id.; see also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978)
(providing a history and explanation of the rule of reason standard).
66. See Pitofsky, supra note 61, at 13.
67. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
68. Id. at 394.
69. Id. at 382.
70. Id. at 408.
71. Id. at 409. Later decisions established that an explicit agreement was not required.
An agreement may be inferred from a course of dealing, conduct, or other circumstances, or by
acquiescence. See United States v. Parke, Davis and Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1960); United
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Recognizing that the Sherman Act did not take away the manufacturer's
right to choose with whom it would conduct business, the Court soon nar-
rowed the scope of the Dr. Miles decision. In United States v. Colgate &
Co., 7 2 the Court literally construed the Sherman Act's prohibition against
contracts and combinations in restraint of trade. Colgate published a price
list and urged dealers to conform to these prices.7" In addition, Colgate
announced that it would refuse to deal with any wholesalers or retailers that
would not agree to maintain these prices.74
Interpreting the proscriptions of the Sherman Act as reaching only con-
tracts or combinations in restraint of trade, the Court held that a unilateral
refusal to deal did not violate the Sherman Act.75 The Court stated that, in
the absence of an attempt to create a monopoly, the Sherman Act did not
restrict the manufacturer's right to choose the parties with whom it would
deal.76 In addition, the manufacturer could announce in advance its pricing
policy and those circumstances under which it would refuse to deal.77
Although the Colgate principle recognized the manufacturer's right to
unilaterally refuse to deal with a customer, the Court soon limited this prin-
ciple. Three years later, in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,78 the manufac-
turer not only promulgated its pricing policy and announced its intention to
refuse to deal with noncomplying dealers, but also established a system to
enforce these pricing policies.79 Beech-Nut solicited assurances from its
dealers that they would maintain a certain price level and used these dealers
to police other dealers in order to ensure compliance with its pricing poli-
cies." o Dealers violating Beech-Nut's pricing policies or selling to noncom-
plying dealers were terminated and boycotted."1 Beech-Nut would reinstate
terminated dealers if they provided assurances of future compliance with
Beech-Nut's pricing policies.8 2
The Court concluded that these methods went beyond the manufacturer's
States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455 (1922); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 210
(1921); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1920). Butsee Business
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1525 (1988).
72. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
73. Id. at 303.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 307.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
79. Id. at 444-45.
80. Id. at 445-46.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 446.
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right to refuse to deal enunciated in Colgate.83 The Court held that Beech-
Nut's enforcement system and the required dealer assurances of cooperation
constituted a restraint of competition and unfair trade practice in violation
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.84
While the courts generally continued to enforce the per se rule against
vertical price fixing in the period after Beech-Nut, state pressure on Congress
to permit a "fair trade" exemption from the Sherman Act8 5 and a growing
number of judicial decisions upholding state fair trade laws 6 prompted Con-
gress to grant a fair trade exemption in 1937. 8' Growing discontent with the
economic consequences of the state fair trade exemption88 caused Congress
83. Id. at 454.
84. Id. at 444, 455. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), the FTC is empow-
ered to condemn and suppress unfair methods of competition in commerce. By judicial inter-
pretation, this includes enforcement of the Sherman Act. Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at 453-55.
85. See E. KINTNER, 2 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS § 10.16 (1980). In 1937, the year of
passage of the federal fair trade exemption, 37 states had enacted fair trade laws and six other
states had proposed them. See also infra notes 87-88.
86. See Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936) (up-
holding the constitutionality of Illinois' Fair Trade Act); Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc.
v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S. 198 (1936) (upholding the constitutionality of California's Fair
Trade Act). State fair trade laws permitted manufacturers to control resale prices through
vertical price fixing. Fair trade laws in California and Illinois were upheld by the Supreme
Court in 1936. Id. at 201; Old Dearborn, 299 U.S. at 191-98.
87. Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 693, repealed by Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801. The Miller-Tydings Act ex-
empted businesses in states authorizing resale price maintenance from the proscriptions of the
Sherman Act. Id. In states without an authorizing statute, vertical price fixing was still held
to be illegal per se. Id.
88. Id. Vertical price fixing in all contexts remained illegal per se until Congress passed
the Miller-Tydings Act in 1937, amending the Sherman Act. Id. The Miller-Tydings Act
permitted manufacturers to prescribe minimum prices for the intrastate resale of products
bearing the "trademark, brand or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity" if
such practice was lawful under state statute, common law or public policy. Id. The McGuire
Act of 1952 expanded the power of the manufacturer to set minimum prices by binding non-
parties to the resale price maintenance (RPM) contracts or agreements. Act of July 14, 1952,
ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631, 632, repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
145, 89 Stat. 801. Thus, if one dealer in a state had entered into an RPM agreement with a
manufacturer, then all other dealers in that manufacturer's product in the state were required
to abide by the minimum prices. Id.
Both of these acts required "free and open competition with commodities of the same gen-
eral class" in order for the manufacturer to be eligible for the exemption from the Sherman
Act. Ch. 690, 50 Stat. at 693. The free and open competition requirement, however, in no way
assured the consumer the benefits of vigorous price competition. One study, conducted by the
Justice Department under President Nixon and cited in a 1969 Economic Report of the Presi-
dent, found that these fair trade practices increased the price of products by 18 to 27 percent.
S. REP. No. 280, supra note 16, at 2. Another study determined that if these acts were re-
pealed, consumers would save approximately $1.2 billion. Id. For these and other reasons, the
number of states permitting resale price maintenance declined from a peak of 46 to 12 in 1975.
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to rescind the exemption in 1975.89
Following the enactment of the fair trade exemption, the Court continued
its assault on the Colgate principle by further limiting the types of actions
that the Court deemed unilateral. In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Opti-
cal Co. 90 and United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,9" the Court reiterated its
position on manufacturers' actions designed to enforce resale price systems.
At issue in both cases was a system of prices and price enforcement similar
to Beech-Nut's system.
As in Beech-Nut, the Court in Bausch & Lomb and Parke, Davis stressed
the coercive and conspiratorial nature of the pricing system. The pricing
policies in dispute went beyond mere unilateral refusals to deal or dealer
acquiescence to the pricing systems.9 2 In each case, the Court found that the
distributor and licensed dealers conspired to fix resale prices and limit sales,
and held that the cooperative enforcement of the price system and boycotts
of noncomplying dealers constituted a combination in restraint of trade in
violation of the Sherman Act.9"
While affirming the Colgate principle of unilateral action in Beech-Nut,
Bausch & Lomb, and Parke, Davis, the Court substantially limited Colgate's
application, thereby restricting a manufacturer's ability to police and enforce
Recognizing the dampening effect that resale price maintenance had on price competition,
Congress repealed the fair trade acts by passage of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act in 1975.
Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a)
(1982)). The Consumer Goods Pricing Act restored per se illegality to vertical price fixing
without exception.
89. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801
(amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1982)). A number of reasons were cited for rescinding the
fair trade exemption including its inflationary impact, a higher number of business failures, its
facilitation of horizontal price fixing, and unnecessary advertising and sales services expendi-
tures. Hearings, supra note 13, at 69-70. See supra note 88.
90. 321 U.S. 707 (1944). Bausch & Lomb's sole distributor, Soft-Lite, had a dual licens-
ing system. Id. at 714-17. Wholesalers were licensed to sell pink-tinted eyeglass lenses at a
fixed price to licensed retailers, and retailers were licensed to sell the lenses at locally prevailing
prices to the public. Id. Pursuant to the licensing agreements, dealers were prohibited from
selling to unlicensed or noncomplying dealers. Id. at 714. The system was enforced through
surveillance of the licensed dealers and a lens identification system used to trace lenses sold to
unlicensed dealers. Id. Dealers violating the license agreements were terminated. Id. at 715-
16.
91. 362 U.S. 29 (1960). Parke, Davis had a pricing system that included minimum resale
pricing and an enforcement program. Id. at 32-33. It issued a list of minimum resale prices
and refused to sell to wholesalers who did not comply with the pricing scheme or who sold
Parke, Davis products to non-complying retailers. Id. Parke, Davis enforced its resale pricing
system with the cooperation of dealers and by threats of termination and boycotts of noncom-
plying retailers. Id. at 33-34. Noncomplying dealers were reinstated if they agreed to comply
with Parke, Davis' pricing system. Id. at 35-36.
92. Bausch & Lomb, 321 U.S. at 723; Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 44.
93. Bausch & Lomb, 321 U.S. at 723; Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 45.
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a system of suggested retail prices. Because such a system of enforcement
requires cooperation and concerted action between the parties in the distri-
bution system, the arrangement implies an agreement or combination that a
court might, and in these cases did, find a restraint of trade.
After Parke, Davis, the Court had effectively limited the application of the
Colgate principle to cases falling within the narrow Colgate fact pattern.
94
That is, a manufacturer could establish a price list, announce its policies
with respect to terminating noncomplying dealers, and unilaterally refuse to
deal with distributors that did not comply with its prices.95 However, the
manufacturer could not solicit assurances of compliance from dealers, en-
force or coerce compliance from price cutters by enlisting the cooperation of
other dealers to report them, or boycott price cutters in order to obtain com-
pliance and then reinstate them.96 This view survived until the modern
Court reviewed Colgate in the context of a dealer-initiated termination in
Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Corp.9 7 By this time, the Reagan administration's
appointments to the Court and growing acceptance of the Chicago School's
efficiency theory provided the administration with the opportunity to effec-
tively challenge the status of vertical restraints law.
B. The Modern Trend: Vertical Restraints Promote
Efficiency and Competition
The economic efficiency theories of the Chicago School of antitrust law
have significantly influenced the modern debate over the treatment of verti-
cal price restraints.98 These theories shaped the Reagan administration's
94. See, e.g., George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1960). The Supreme Court's substantial narrowing of the Colgate principle prompted the
Black & Decker court to comment that with respect to the status of Colgate, the Supreme
Court "has left a narrow channel through which a manufacturer may pass even though the
facts would have to be of such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex
business enterprise." Id. at 790.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
98. See, e.g., Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws: Faces Sometimes Should Make
Cases, 12 J. CORP. L. 1 (1986) (arguing that, contrary to efficiency theory position, dis-
counters, the group primarily protected by the proscriptions against vertical price fixing, are
economically efficient and enhance competition and consumer welfare); Scherer, The Econom-
ics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (1983) (disputing the economic theory of the
Chicago School regarding vertical restraints); Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market
Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985) (questioning the
vertical restraints analysis of the Chicago School, particularly Judge Bork's analysis); Pitofsky,
supra note 61 (disputing many of the "efficiencies" supported by the efficiency theorists as a
rationale for eliminating the proscription against vertical price fixing and cited by the Sylvania
Court as a basis for overturning Schwinn); Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters." The No-Frills
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policy, which advocates legalization of vertical price restraints,9 9 and placed
the administration in opposition to Congress." The parties have taken the
conflict to the judiciary, and recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that
the Chicago School's efficiency theory has gained adherents on- the Court.
1. Pre-Reagan Judicial Treatment of Vertical Restraints
Although prior decisions demonstrated the Court's growing awareness
and interest in the economic impact of their decisions, Continental T V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. " ' clearly evidenced the influence of Chicago School
theories on the Court's treatment of vertical restraints. A vertical nonprice
restraint, which the Court had only a decade earlier declared illegal per se in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 102 triggered the Sylvania litigation.
The Court reassessed and overruled Schwinn. 103 The Court rationalized its
application of the rule of reason standard to vertical nonprice restraints on
the basis of the potential efficiencies and procompetitive benefits of these re-
straints.R4 Intentionally or not, this decision set the stage for a challenge to
the per se rule against vertical price fixing.
Sylvania, a television manufacturer, had terminated its wholesale dealers
and developed a nonexclusive franchise system that limited the number of
franchises in an area.105 The system also required franchisees to sell the
Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487 (1983) (disputing the
efficiency theorists' arguments in support of eliminating the per se proscription against vertical
price fixing).
99. Compare, e.g., GUIDELINES, supra note 12 and Brief, supra note 14 with R. BORK,
supra note 8 and Posner, supra note 8.
100. Compare, e.g., GUIDELINES, supra note 12 and Brief, supra note 14 with H.R. REP.
No. 421, supra note 15 and S. REP. No. 280, supra note 16.
101. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
102. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). The history of the Court's treatment of vertical nonprice re-
straints illustrates the difficulty the Court has experienced in dealing with the economics of
antitrust issues. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the Court applied
the rule of reason standard to vertical nonprice restraints. Noting that not enough was known
about the impact of these vertical arrangements on competition, the White Motor Court re-
versed a lower court decision applying the per se standard to nonprice restraints. 372 U.S. at
263-64.
Just four years later, however, the Court determined that it knew enough about the competi-
tive effects of vertical restraints and overruled the White Motor decision in Schwinn. In
Schwinn, the Court held the defendant's vertical customer and location restrictions illegal per
se. 388 U.S. at 382. In dicta, the Court indicated that vertical nonprice restraints imposed on
dealers constituted restraints on alienation by manufacturers that could so unreasonably re-
strict competition that a violation of the Sherman Act would result. Id. at 380.
103. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58.
104. Id. at 54-56.
105. Id. at 38.
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merchandise only from prescribed locations.' °6 A disagreement arose be-
tween Continental, a successful franchisee, and Sylvania over the location of
a new franchise near a Continental location. 0 7 In protest of Sylvania's ac-
tion, Continental opened an outlet at another location without Sylvania's
approval.1 8 Sylvania terminated Continental for violating the franchise
agreement, and Continental challenged the franchise contract's location re-
straint as a violation of the Sherman Act.109
The trial court, following Schwinn, found Sylvania in per se violation of
the Sherman Act." 0 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the decision on the grounds that the jury instruction, which required a find-
ing of a per se violation, was erroneous. "' The Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit's decision." 2
Reasoning that vertical nonprice restraints may promote economic effi-
ciency and competition, the Court held that petitioners failed to show that
such restraints had a "pernicious effect on competition or that they lack[ed]
any redeeming virtue.""' 3 Noting that the vertical nonprice restraints in
Sylvania actually stimulated interbrand competition, 1 4 the Court overruled
Schwinn and held that the rule of reason was the appropriate evidentiary
standard to apply to vertical nonprice restraints." 5 Although the Court re-
affirmed its support of the per se rule against vertical price fixing, 1"6 Justice
White noted in a prescient concurring opinion that these same procompeti-
tive and efficiency justifications could support the application of the rule of
reason standard to all vertical restraints" 7 and, therefore, the Court's opin-
ion called into question the absolute prohibition against vertical price
fixing. 8
106. Id.
107. Id. at 39.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 40.
110. Id. at 41.
111. Id.; see also GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 982, 987-88
(9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
112. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59.
113. Id. at 58 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
114. Id. at 38-39.
115. Id. at 57-59.
116. Id. at 51 n.18.
117. Id. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
118. Id. According to Justice White in his concurring opinion, the Court did not satisfac-
torily distinguish between price and nonprice restraints in its Sylvania decision. Id. at 69-70.
The majority disposed of the issue by stating that the per se illegality of vertical price restraints
involved significantly different issues of analysis and policy. Id. at 70. Justice White noted
that the Court's failure to adequately explain why vertical price fixing did not give rise to the
same efficiencies called into question the per se rule against vertical price fixing. Id.
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2. Vertical Price Fixing Developments Under the Reagan
Justice Department
During the Reagan terms, the administration pursued a policy designed to
restrict the scope of and, ultimately, eliminate the per se rule against vertical
price restraints. Under the direction of the Department of Justice, the Rea-
gan administration policy succeeded in undermining both public and private
vertical price fixing actions under the Sherman Act.'" 9 First, the adminis-
tration abdicated its responsibilities with respect to enforcement of the per se
prohibition against vertical price fixing. Despite the number of private verti-
cal price fixing suits brought during the Reagan administration,120 the DOJ
had not instituted one government vertical price fixing action through
1986. 121
Second, through a series of writings 122 and amicus filings,'1 3 the DOJ at-
tempted to undermine private vertical price fixing actions and urged the
Supreme Court to overturn the per se rule against vertical price fixing.
Under an "amicus intervention program" established in 1981,124 the DOJ
intervened on behalf of defendant manufacturers in private vertical price fix-
ing antitrust suits.'2 5 One of the DOJ's most controversial briefs was filed in
1983 with the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 126
Therein, the DOJ urged the Court either to overturn the per se prohibition
against vertical price fixing or to apply the per se standard only to explicit
agreements to fix prices or price levels. 1
27
Finally, the DOJ promulgated a set of "Vertical Restraints Guidelines"' 
28
that detailed the DOJ's policy with respect to enforcement of vertical re-
119. H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 2.
120. In the period from the Monsanto decision to 1987 alone, approximately 70 private
vertical price fixing actions were instituted. Id.
121. S. REP. No. 280, supra note 16, at 2. In addition, the DOJ opened only six investiga-
tions during the Reagan administration, compared to the 40 it opened in the period 1976 to
1981. Id. at 23.
122. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
123. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 124-27.
124. H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 5.
125. Id.
126. 465 U.S. 752 (1984); see Brief, supra note 14; see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914)
(urging the Supreme Court to grant Monsanto's petition for writ of certiorari). The amicus
filing in Monsanto was controversial for three reasons: (1) Congress fully supported the per se
standard for vertical price fixing, (2) the status of the per se standard was not an issue that
either party raised in the action, and (3) Monsanto was an important and very visible case, and
therefore, there was no assurance that the Court would not address the per se issue. See H.R.
REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 4-10; S. REP. No. 280, supra note 16, at 3-5.
127. Brief, supra note 14, at 13-29.
128. GUIDELINES, supra note 12.
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straints law.1 29 Purporting to deal only with vertical nonprice restraints, the
guidelines essentially established a no-action policy with respect to vertical
price restraints. 3 The guidelines stated that where a manufacturer had a
bona fide distribution program embodying nonprice and price restraints, the
DOJ would analyze the system using the rule of reason under either of two
conditions. The DOJ would use the rule of reason if there was no "direct or
circumstantial evidence (other than effects on price) establishing an explicit
agreement as to specific prices," or where "the nonprice restraints [were]
plausibly designed to create efficiencies . . . and the price restraint [was]
merely ancillary to the nonprice restraint."' 3 1
3. Judicial Treatment of Vertical Price Restraints During the
Reagan Administration
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 132 was the first major vertical
price fixing case of the Reagan era. The Supreme Court's decision in Mon-
santo can be seen as a victory for the Reagan administration's efforts to un-
dermine or eliminate the per se rule against vertical price fixing. In
Monsanto, the DOJ submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to overturn
the per se rule.' 3 3 While the Court declined to address the issue directly, 1
34
it placed an additional burden of proof on the plaintiff not found in other
areas of antitrust law, thereby significantly narrowing the per se standard's
scope as applied to vertical price fixing.' 3 5
The issue in Monsanto was whether a manufacturer's unilateral action
136
or the concerted action of the manufacturer and a complaining dealer caused
a dealer's termination. Spray-Rite, a distributor of Monsanto products, sued
129. Id. The DOJ's enforcement policy was based on the potential procompetitive effects
of vertical restraints commonly cited in Chicago School literature, including realization of
economies of scale from a reduction in the number of outlets and lower distribution costs,
increased provision of sales services, discouragement of free-riding by discounters, see infra
note 228, improved product quality and safety, reduced transaction costs, and facilitation of
new producer entry into the market. Id. at 14-15.
130. H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 6-7.
131. See GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 10-11 (emphasis added).
132. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
133. See Brief, supra note 14.
134. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761 n.7.
135. Id. at 764. A congressional report commented: "Not only must a plaintiff seeking to
reach the jury prove a conspiracy, but he also must disprove the existence of any or all hypo-
thetical explanations for the manufacturer's conduct that 'might justify a dealer termination.'
To many observers, such a test appears to be unnecessary and unfairly harsh." H.R. REP. No.
421, supra note 15, at 14.
136. Unilateral or independent actions of a manufacturer in refusing to deal with or termi-
nating a dealer are legitimate actions not within the scope of the Sherman Act. United States
v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
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Monsanto under section 1 of the Sherman Act for terminating Spray-Rite's
distributorship. 137  Spray-Rite alleged that competing distributors' com-
plaints about Spray-Rite's failure to comply with Monsanto's suggested
prices resulted in its termination. 138 Further, Spray-Rite alleged that Mon-
santo and the complaining distributors conspired to fix resale prices and
took other actions in furtherance of that conspiracy. 139 Monsanto countered
that Spray-Rite was terminated because of its failure to provide adequate
nonprice promotional services.'4o
The jury found that Monsanto's actions were in furtherance of a conspir-
acy to fix resale prices and, therefore, were a per se violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 14' The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and established a standard of
proof under which a dealer's termination following the complaints of a rival
dealer could give rise to an inference of concerted action. 142
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision but reversed the
appeals court's standard of proof and established a more stringent stan-
dard. 14 3 Reasoning that allowing a jury to infer an agreement to fix prices
from a dealer's termination following the complaints of a rival dealer might
deter economically efficient and procompetitive conduct,"' the Court de-
clared that mere evidence of dealer complaints was not sufficient to prove an
agreement to fix prices. 145 Rather, the plaintiff must present direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent ac-
tion by the manufacturer and distributor.'46 The Court, however, found
that the plaintiff had met this more stringent burden of proof and affirmed
the lower court decision. 147
Monsanto defined a new evidentiary standard for proof of a vertical con-
spiracy to fix prices. The Court shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff to
disprove independent action and, thus effectively revitalized Colgate's dis-
137. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 757.
138. Id. at 758-59.
139. Id. at 757-58. Actions in furtherance of the conspiracy included boycotting Spray-
Rite and the use of compensation programs, areas of primary responsibility and shipping poli-
cies to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices. Id.
140. Id. at 757.
141. Id. at 757-58.
142. Id. at 758-59.
143. Id. at 759.
144. Id. at 762-64.
145. Id. at 764.
146. Id. The Court stated that the plaintiff's evidence must reasonably tend to prove that
the manufacturer and others had "a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to
achieve an unlawful objective." Id.
147. Id. at 765, 768.
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tinction between concerted and independent action.148 Again, the Court
based its holding on the efficiencies resulting from conduct that might be
perceived as price fixing. 149 The decision was controversial and confusing
for a number of reasons.
First, many lower courts interpreted the decision as requiring direct or
circumstantial evidence of an explicit agreement between the manufacturer
and complaining dealer to fix prices or price levels. ' 0 Second, Congress and
the lower courts interpreted Monsanto as removing from the jury its tradi-
tional antitrust charge of drawing inferences of a conspiracy from a set of
facts. 15" ' In some cases, the lower courts required the plaintiff to prove that
an explicit agreement existed rather than allowing the jury to infer an agree-
ment from a termination "following" or "in response to" complaints from a
dealer.' 52 Third, the Court's decision revealed an unjustifiable lack of confi-
dence in the jury's ability to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate business
practices.' 53 Fourth, by requiring evidence disproving independent action
on the part of the manufacturer and dealer, the Monsanto decision substan-
tially increased the quantum of proof needed for a plaintiff's action to reach
148. Id. at 762-63; see also supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
149. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-64.
150. See Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Serv., Inc., 799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986) (man-
ufacturer's action in terminating a discounter was unilateral, despite evidence of the coercive
acts of a rival dealer and a pretextual nonprice restraint's defense), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728
(1988); McCabe's Furniture, Inc., v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986) (appli-
cation of per se standard to a dealer termination was in error because nonprice as well as price
factors motivated the termination), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988); Morrison v. Murray
Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (wholesale dealer failed to prove he was terminated
pursuant to a conspiracy to suppress price competition between a supplier and a rival dealer);
Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986) (in the absence of
evidence of an agreement to raise prices, an agreement between a supplier and dealer to termi-
nate a rival dealer is not illegal per se), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988); Business Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp. 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986) (district court erred in finding
manufacturer's termination of a dealer a per se violation of the Sherman Act without proof of
an explicit agreement on prices), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988). Although the Monsanto deci-
sion did not specifically state that an explicit agreement was required, many jurisdictions have
interpreted it that way. The evidence presented in the above cases was sufficient to prove a
conspiracy between a manufacturer and dealer to terminate a rival dealer for price cutting, but
the appeals courts generally held that Monsanto did not permit an inference of a conspiracy to
suppress price competition. H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 21-25. Something more
than evidence of complaints was needed. Id. Exoneration of the manufacturers was invariably
based on the procompetitive benefits of nonprice restraints. Id.
151. H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 17-18.
152. See cases cited supra note 150.
153. H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 19-20. This is a function that the jury freely
exercises in other areas of antitrust, such as monopolization cases under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. Id.
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the jury.'5 4 Finally, the decision impliedly attached greater weight to the
potential efficiencies and procompetitive benefits of the conduct than to the
very real impact of the dealer's termination on price competition.' 5 5
4. Congressional Response.: Vertical Price Fixing is Illegal Per Se
Congress expressed its unequivocal support of the per se rule against verti-
cal price fixing when it passed the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975,156
which rescinded the state fair trade exemption. The subsequent executive
actions and judicial decisions undermining the rule"5 7 understandably trou-
bled Congress and prompted legislative action to prevent further erosion of
the rule. First, Congress used its funding powers to restrain the DOJ's ef-
forts to undermine the per se rule. 151 Prior to the DOJ's oral argument of its
Monsanto amicus filing, Congress passed the DOJ appropriation bill for
1984. ' The bill prohibited the DOJ from using its funds to urge the rever-
sal of the per se rule against vertical price fixing. 161
Second, Congress passed a resolution vehemently rejecting the DOJ's non-
enforcement policy with respect to vertical restraints law.' 61 The DOJ's
lack of enforcement of vertical restraints law during the Reagan administra-
154. Id. at 16-17; see infra text accompanying notes 207-08.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 207-73. The Monsanto Court noted that a finding
of a per se violation might deter legitimate manufacturer-dealer communication designed to
assure that the product reaches the consumer efficiently. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64.
Dealer terminations "in response to" complaints from a dealer about price cutting have a very
real, although indirect, impact on prices and are equivalent to a boycott. See Gerla, supra note
98, at 9-12.
156. Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1982)); see
supra note 89; text accompanying notes 85-89; see also H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 8.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 119-55.
158. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102-03 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter 1984 Appropriations Act]. The congressional funding restrictions directed that no funds
could be used for any activity the purpose of which was to overturn or alter the per se prohibi-
tion against resale price maintenance in effect under the federal antitrust laws. Id. Additional
funding restrictions were passed in 1986, Department of Justice Appropriation Act, 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-180, § 605, 99 Stat. 1141, 1169-70 (1985) [hereinafter 1986 Appropriations Act];
1987, Department of Justice Appropriation Act, 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 605, 100 Stat.
1783-45, 1783-73 (1986); and 1988, Department of Justice Appropriation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-202, § 605, 101 Stat. 1329-8, 1329-38 (1987), all of which prohibited the DOJ from
using funds for any activity designed to alter the per se prohibition against vertical price fixing.
159. 1984 Appropriations Act, supra note 158.
160. Id. The bill, in effect, prevented Assistant Attorney General William Baxter from
orally arguing the DOJ's Monsanto amicus brief, which urged the reversal of the per se rule,
before the Supreme Court. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 5.
161. 1986 Appropriations Act, supra note 158, at 1169-70. The DOJ had not brought a
single government price fixing case since 1981 and had conducted only six investigations, none
of which were ever brought to trial. S. REP. No. 280, supra note 16, at 2, 23.
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tion greatly concerned Congress.162 Four months after the expiration of the
1984 funding restriction, 16  the DOJ released the "Vertical Restraints
Guidelines of January 23, 1985," which established its policy on enforce-
ment of vertical restraints law. 64 Congress viewed the guidelines as another
attempt to influence judicial treatment of vertical price fixing and to dilute
the per se standard by blurring the distinction between price and nonprice
restraints.1 65 In response, Congress passed the Vertical Restraints Guide-
lines Resolution. 166 In the resolution, Congress rejected the DOJ's enforce-
ment policy and interpretation of the law as stated in the guidelines and
demanded that the Attorney General recall the guidelines.1 67 In addition,
Congress stated in the resolution that the courts should not construe the
guidelines as an accurate representation of either current antitrust law or
Congress' position on vertical price fixing. 
6 8
Finally, the Monsanto decision itself prompted a congressional reaction.
Congress saw the Monsanto decision as hindering private antitrust actions
and remedies at a time when government enforcement of vertical price fixing
law was lacking.' 69 Although the Monsanto decision reaffirmed the per se
standard for vertical price fixing, it was the first evidence that the Reagan
administration's "efficiency" view was beginning to influence lower court
and Supreme Court decisions relating to vertical price fixing. In response,
Congress proposed amendments to the Sherman Act that would restore the
per se standard to its pre-Monsanto status. 7 ° These bills, pending when the
162. S. REP. 280, supra note 16, at 2, 23.
163. Upon assurances from the DOJ that it would enforce vertical price fixing law as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, the 1984 funding restriction against the DOJ's vertical price
fixing activities was allowed to expire on October 1, 1984. Thus, the 1985 bill deleted all
references to vertical restraints. Id. at 3.
164. See GUIDELINES, supra note 12; text accompanying notes 128-31.
165. 1986 Appropriations Act, supra note 158, at 1169.
166. Id. at 1169-70.
167. Id.
168. Id. The Resolution stated that the DOJ's Vertical Restraints Guidelines:
(1) are not an accurate expression of the Federal antitrust laws or of congressional
intent with regard to the application of such laws ... ;
(2) shall not be accorded any force of law or be treated by the courts of the United
States as binding or persuasive; and
(3) should be recalled by the Attorney General.
Id.
169. H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 2.
170. S. 430, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S1483-84 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1987);
H.R. 585, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H254 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1987). These pro-
posals sought to amend the Sherman Act in order to codify the per se standard against vertical
price fixing and establish the quantum of evidence sufficient to meet the plaintiff's burden
under the per se standard. S. REP. No. 280, supra note 16, at 9-12; H.R. REP. No. 421, supra
note 15, at 30-31. Both proposals eliminate Monsanto's requirement of presenting evidence
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
100th Congress ended, were reintroduced in the 101st Congress.17 '
Congress' rescission of the state fair trade exemption in 1975 reestablished
its position on vertical price fixing and the per se standard. The Monsanto
decision prompted congressional action which reaffirmed Congress' unequiv-
ocal and consistent support for the per se rule against vertical price fixing
and evidenced Congress' intent to maintain the standard. This clear record
of congressional support for the per se standard existed prior to the time the
Court heard Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. 172 Conse-
quently, Sharp provided an opportunity for the Court either to defer to Con-
gressional intent by reinstating the pre-Monsanto standard, or to adopt the
administration's position by further limiting or overturning the per se
standard.
III. BUSINESS ELECTRONICS CORP. V. SHARP ELECTRONICS CORP.
In Sharp, the Court further narrowed the absolute prohibition against ver-
tical price fixing in the context of a dealer termination. Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, addressed the issue of the standard applicable to a
dealer termination and affirmed the appeals court's application of the rule of
reason.' 7 ' Characterizing the restraint at issue as a vertical nonprice re-
straint, Justice Scalia stated that the Court's holdings in Sylvania and Mon-
santo dictated a presumption for applying the rule of reason to vertical
nonprice restraints. 17 4 Justice Scalia found no evidence that an agreement to
terminate a discounting dealer, without an additional agreement between the
manufacturer and a complaining dealer on prices, restricted competition or
that tends to exclude independent action and instead allow the jury to infer an illegal agree-
ment from a dealer's termination in response to or because of complaints from a rival dealer.
S. REP. No. 280, supra note 16, at 11; H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 31-32.
171. The new Senate and House versions of these bills were introduced in the first session
of the 101st Congress. The Senate version, S. 865, was introduced on April 19, 1989, 135
CONG. REC. 4435, 4437 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989). The House version, H.R. 1236, was intro-
duced on March 2, 1989. 135 CONG. REC. H510, 527 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1989). The major
change from the previous versions is the prohibition of the conduct permitted by the Court in
Sharp. In response to the Supreme Court decision in Sharp, the new versions proscribe agree-
ments between a seller and a dealer to terminate another dealer for its pricing policies, whether
or not prices or price levels are agreed upon. Id.
172. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
173. Id. at 1517, 1525.'
174. Id. at 1520. Citing Sylvania and Monsanto, Justice Scalia stated that departure from
the rule of reason standard should "be based on demonstrable economic effect rather than ...
upon formalistic line drawing." Id. (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977)). Noting that vertical nonprice restraints have certain procompetitive
benefits, Justice Scalia declared that vertical nonprice restraints had not been shown to have
such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue" as to warrant a
standard of per se illegality. Id. at 1519 (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58).
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reduced output. 75 To the contrary, Justice Scalia indicated that such re-
straints could promote competition and economic efficiencies '7 6 that would
not be realized if the Court applied a per se standard.
Justice Scalia then focused on the interbrand-intrabrand competition dis-
tinction. Noting that interbrand competition is the principal concern of an-
titrust law,' 7 7 Justice Scalia declared that as long as the per se standard
protected interbrand competition, it was not needed to protect intrabrand
competition. 7 ' First, Justice Scalia stated that interbrand competition pro-
vided a significant check on attempts to exploit intrabrand market power.' 79
Second, a per se standard of illegality encompassing all vertical restraints
created a perverse incentive for manufacturers to vertically integrate, which
would result in fewer small businesses and higher market concentration. 180
Third, vertical nonprice restraints, unlike vertical price restraints, do not
facilitate cartelization 18 and, therefore, do not require a per se standard to
175. Id. at 1521.
176. Id. at 1519-20. Manufacturers can use these restraints to
induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital
and labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the con-
sumer .... [and to] induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide
service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products....
The availability and quality of such services affect a manufacturer's goodwill and the
competitiveness of his product. Because of market imperfections such as the so-
called 'free-rider' effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely
competitive situation ....
Id. (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977)).
177. Id. at 1519.
178. Id. at 1520.
179. Id. Theoretically, if a manufacturer attempts to exploit intrabrand market power by
raising prices, consumers will switch to the lower priced product of a rival manufacturer.
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n. 19. This result, however, depends on the convenience to consumers,
the amount of competition, and the ability of consumers to exploit this competition. Id. at 54.
180. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1520. This argument assumes that if the per se standard prevents
the utilization of nonprice restraints to achieve distributive efficiencies, the manufacturer will
vertically integrate by purchasing or establishing retail businesses, thereby eliminating the
small, independent distributorships. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 n.26. A manufacturer's decision
to vertically integrate, however, involves more than just a consideration of distributive efficien-
cies. Although transaction costs may decline, a manufacturer must also consider the capital
investment and expertise required and the additional risk inherent in a decision to vertically
integrate. See Halverson, An Overview of Legal and Economic Issues and the Relevance of the
Vertical Merger Guidelines, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 80-81 (1983). Therefore, the decision is
not simply a choice between vertical nonprice restraints or vertical integration.
181. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1520. A cartel is a combination or association of companies
joined together to control competition in the pricing, marketing, or production of a product.
A cartel often attempts to monopolize a particular product or industry. The critical issue with
respect to vertical price fixing by members of a cartel is whether a group of manufacturers is
able to stabilize or maintain prices at an agreed level. Manufacturers often use competitors'
retail prices to monitor compliance with the agreed prices. See Pitofsky, supra note 61, at 16.
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prevent anticompetitive conduct.' 82
Next, Justice Scalia reasoned that the application of the per se standard to
manufacturers' actions that are not based on price agreements would deter
or penalize legitimate communication or conduct between manufacturers
and dealers.' 8 3 One of the rationales for the Sylvania Court's rejection of the
per se standard for vertical nonprice restraints, he noted, was to allow such
procompetitive communication or conduct. '8 4 Justice Scalia reasoned that
imposing a per se standard in this situation would encourage terminated dis-
counters to allege price fixing in order to attack terminations for nonprice
reasons and would deter legitimate and competitively useful conduct.' 85
The rule of reason adequately protected dealers against unreasonable re-
straints of trade. Rejecting the plaintiff's' 8 6 and the dissent's 187 remaining
arguments, Justice Scalia concluded that economic analysis supports the
view that vertical restraints should not be illegal per se unless they include
an explicit agreement to fix prices.' 88
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's characteriza-
tion of the issue as one concerning vertical nonprice restraints."9 Justice
Stevens contended that an agreement initiated by a complaining dealer to
terminate a competing dealer because of the competing dealer's price cutting
policies was not a nonprice restraint, but rather an unreasonable restraint on
price competition.'9 o A more proper analysis of the issue, he stated, would
have focused on horizontal restraints and the distinction between naked and
182. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1520. The dissent argued and this Note argues that a termination
of a dealer for price cutting is a price restraint and, therefore, will facilitate cartelization. Id. at
1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1520 (majority opinion).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1521.
186. Id. at 1524-25. Justice Scalia rejected BEC's arguments that the application of the per
se standard to this vertical restraint was controlled by precedent on horizontal restraints and
by vertical restraint cases that established that no explicit agreement on prices or price levels
was required to apply the per se standard. Id. He also disagreed that a price agreement will
always follow from a dealer's termination and noted that a dealer's termination may quite
plausibly be motivated by a desire to induce dealer services rather than to fix prices. Id. at
1523.
187. Id. at 1522-23. Justice Scalia rejected the dissent's characterization of BEC's termina-
tion as a naked restraint of competition at the retail level. Id. He stated that there is a quite
plausible purpose of this restraint; specifically, to induce a dealer to provide services, which
* therefore makes the restraint ancillary. Id. In addition, Justice Scalia concluded that BEC's
termination was not a horizontal restraint because a manufacturer imposed it, not other deal-
ers. Id.
188. Id. at 1525.
189. Id. at 1526 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
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ancillary restraints of trade. 9' The dissent asserted that BEC's termination
was comparable to a group boycott, therefore, the Court's holding in United
States v. General Motors Corp. 192 should control.' 93
Justice Stevens noted that past Court decisions had permitted reasonable
covenants in restraint of trade if they were ancillary to the main purpose of a
contract and did not violate the rule of reason.' 94 Justice Stevens argued,
however, that the subject restraint was neither a term of nor ancillary to
Sharp's dealership agreements with BEC and Hartwell and was, therefore,
not a vertical nonprice restraint.' 9 He found the majority's reliance on Syl-
vania misplaced. Distinguishing Sylvania's contractual location restraint,
Justice Stevens noted that Sharp had not imposed any vertical nonprice re-
straints, such as location, territory, or customer requirements, on either BEC
or Hartwell. 96 Because neither BEC nor Hartwell were contractually obli-
gated to provide dealer services, the procompetitive benefits that the major-
ity posited as resulting from this "nonprice restraint" were mere
possibilities.' 97 Thus, BEC's termination was a naked restraint with no pur-
pose but to suppress price competition. 98
Justice Stevens next examined the character of the termination in order to
illustrate its anticompetitive nature. He contended that the Court should
have focused on the character of the agreement and its economic conse-
quences, rather than on the number of parties involved in the agreement.' 99
Criticizing the majority's summary disposal of General Motors and Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,2 Justice Stevens found that the princi-
pal elements of a group boycott established in those cases were also present
here.2 ' He argued that BEC's termination accomplished the same purpose,
191. Id.
192. 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (concerted action by automotive dealers, automotive dealer as-
sociations, and the automobile manufacturer to terminate business dealings and refuse to do
business with discounters was an unlawful conspiracy or group boycott in restraint of trade).
193. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1531-32.
194. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1526-27. Justice Stevens noted, for example, that contractual
covenants not to compete in a particular business, when reasonable, are permitted in contracts
for the sale of a business. Id. The main purpose of the ancillary restraint must be to protect
one party from the unrestrained competition of another. Id. But where it serves only to re-
strain trade and destroy competition, it is unreasonable. Id.
195. Id. at 1528.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1529.
199. Id. at 1530-32.
200. 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (concerted action among retailers, manufacturers, and distribu-
tors of appliances to terminate business dealings and refuse to deal with plaintiff retailer was a
group boycott or conspiracy in restraint of trade).
201. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1532. Recounting the typical elements of a group boycott, Justice
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and differed only in degree from that struck down in General Motors. 20 2 The
agreement, Justice Stevens concluded, was a naked horizontal restraint on
price competition rather than an ancillary vertical nonprice restraint
designed to further the manufacturer's distributional policies.
203
Finally, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's interpretation of Sylvania
as permitting the elimination of intrabrand competition based only on the
"quite plausible" assumption of improvements in interbrand competition.2°
He asserted that Sylvania required something more than a mere possibility of
a benefit to interbrand competition. Justice Stevens concluded that this re-
straint provided no demonstrable improvements to interbrand competition,
therefore, the restraint should not evade the Court's rule of per se illegality
by the mere possibility of procompetitive benefits. 2°5 He criticized the ma-
jority's "plausible purposes" justification for this naked restraint as contrary
to one of the fundamental objectives of the Sherman Act - to foster price
competition."'
IV. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS: AN ECONOMIC CONTROVERSY AND AN
EVIDENTIARY DEBATE
Underlying the Court's decision in Sharp is a growing dissatisfaction with
the per se rule against vertical price fixing. While the Sharp Court preserved
the per se standard in form, it significantly narrowed its applicability to cases
where an aggrieved party can prove the existence of an explicit agreement on
prices or price levels, thereby undermining the standard's vitality.2"7 After
Monsanto and Sharp, the terminated dealer's burden of proof increased sub-
stantially; indeed, it has been equated to a burden requiring proof of a formal
offer and acceptance."' In establishing such a stringent evidentiary stan-
Stevens noted that BEC's termination was not an independent action controlled by the Colgate
decision, but a concerted action motivated by an ultimatum from a complaining dealer. Id. at
1529-32. Elimination of price competition on the dealer level, rather than the violation of a
vertical nonprice restraint, was the primary motivating factor in the termination of BEC. Id.
at 1532. The economic consequences arising from the coercive activities of one competing
dealer on the manufacturer are as pernicious as those resulting from the coercive activities of a
number of competing dealers. Id. Thus, the sole difference between this action and a group
boycott was the number of parties involved. Id.
202. Id. at 1531-32.
203. Id. at 1532.
204. Id. at 1536. If a per se standard could be avoided simply by positing a "plausible
purpose," then the same purposes could be cited to evade the application of a per se standard
in other price fixing cases where it might be argued that the defendant could provide better
services. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1525.
208. See H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 16-17.
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dard, the Court has effectively enabled a manufacturer and dealer to circum-
vent the per se standard and fix or maintain prices by terminating a
discounting dealer. The complexity and expense of a rule of reason case will
deter terminated dealers from bringing actions against manufacturers and
will likely allow manufacturers to terminate dealers abusively and with
impunity.
The increase in the plaintiff's burden of proof will result in less legal pro-
tection for discounters and more dealer terminations. The loss of dis-
counters will result in a number of unfavorable economic consequences.
First, inflationary pressures20 9 and higher prices21° will follow the reduction
in price competition. Second, reduced consumer choice will result in lower
consumer utility.21 Third, inefficient manufacturers and dealers will insu-
late themselves from the competitive market through vertical price fixing.2" 2
Finally, business failures will increase and new business start-ups will de-
crease in a vertical price fixing environment.2" 3 Monsanto and Sharp reduce
both intrabrand and interbrand competition and, thus, create less competi-
tive industries, diminish consumer welfare, and produce less flexible and effi-
cient price and distribution systems.
However, the Court and the administration argue that less price competi-
tion is beneficial if it results in better sales services, eliminates market imper-
fections such as free riding, and increases output by attracting new dealers to
209. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 69.
210. A 1987 study conducted in one city for the Senate Judiciary Committee found that
consumers pay 18 to 30 percent less in discount stores than in full-price retail stores. See
Hearings, supra note 13, at 1 (opening statement of Sen. Metzenbaum, Acting Chairman, cit-
ing a staff study). Studies conducted just prior to the passage of the Consumer Goods Pricing
Act of 1975 confirm this statistic. S. REP. No. 280, supra note 16, at 2.
211. See, e.g., Gerla, supra note 98, at 3-5. All consumers do not desire the same level of
prices and services, and the elimination of the discounter will result in more standardized and
uniform distribution channels. Discounters provide the customer with alternative price/prod-
uct/service mixes that increase consumer choice and maximize consumer welfare. Id.
212. Pitofsky, supra note 61, at 15-16. At the manufacturer level, inefficient manufacturers
will be able to maintain prices at levels that reduce dealer pressure to lower wholesale prices,
thereby insulating themselves from the competitive markets. Id. Neither the manufacturer
nor dealer will have to compete on the merits of the product or on a price basis. Promotional
or nonprice competition will take over as it has done in the automobile industry. The reduc-
tion in price pressure on the manufacturer from the discounter will result in less competitive
industries. See generally Gerla, Competition on the Merits - A Sound Industrial Policy for
Antitrust Law, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 553 (1984).
213. S. REP. No. 466, supra note 13, at 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1569, 1571-12. New dealers are generally more efficient than established dealers and
compete primarily on a price basis. Hearings, supra note 13, at 105 (statement of Mr. Monroe
G. Milstein, Chairman of Burlington Coat Factory, citing 1975 Justice Department Study). Id.
at 102. Vertical price fixing will deter the establishment of new businesses if these businesses
cannot compete on a price basis. Id.
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invest in the capital and labor required to distribute more efficiently.2" 4 The
Sharp Court termed these factors the "quite plausible purpose[s]" of Sharp's
termination of BEC.215 Those advocating the elimination of the per se rule
against vertical price fixing also utilize these same arguments.
216
The Chicago School and the DOJ argue that economic efficiency factors
should control in determining an evidentiary standard for vertical re-
straints. 217 They contend that the procompetitive benefits and efficiencies of
vertical restraints justify at least applying the rule of reason to vertical re-
straints if not a standard of per se legality. 218 Traditional antitrust advocates
oppose the elimination of the per se standard and argue that vertical price
fixing promotes neither efficiency nor consumer welfare. 21 9  Although
procompetitive benefits and efficiencies may result from vertical price fixing,
advocates contend that the pernicious effects on competition outweigh such
speculative benefits.
The legal debate over the appropriate standard to apply to vertical re-
straints, specifically price restraints, understandably arises from the inability
of scholars to agree on the effects of these restraints on the business environ-
ment. Economics scholars agree, and empirical evidence shows, that prices
are higher under vertically-fixed prices than under unrestrained price com-
petition.22 ° Scholars disagree, however, over whether the procompetitive
benefits realized from vertical price fixing sufficiently warrant the suppres-
sion of price competition. 221 The Sharp Court decided that the benefits to
competition and efficiency, which a dealer termination might produce, so
outweighed the effects on price competition that the plaintiff's additional
evidentiary burden of proving an agreement on price or price levels was
justified.
214. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1519-20 (1988). Under
this theory, the demand induced by increased services and information more than offsets the
dampening effect of higher prices on demand. See supra note 8. The argument implies that
higher prices result in more or better services. There is no empirical evidence to show, how-
ever, that one follows directly from the other.
215. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1522.
216. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST
L.J. 135 (1984); Posner, supra note 8; Abbott, Paradox Regained: Towards a New Economic
Approach to VerticalRestraints Policy, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 565 (1980); Bork, supra note 8;
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
217. See supra note 8.
218. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8; GUIDELINES, supra note 12; Brief, supra note 14.
219. See, e.g., supra note 10; Scherer, supra note 98; Gerla, supra note 98.
220. S. REP. No. 280, supra note 16, at 2.
221. Compare, e.g., Scherer, supra note 98 and Pitofsky, supra note 98 with Posner, supra
note 8 and Bork, supra note 8.
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A. Dealer Services and the Free Rider Problem
The Court's decision in Sharp rested on the assumption that vertical re-
straints are procompetitive and efficiency enhancing. Proponents of vertical
price fixing advance the correlative argument22 that manufacturers may use
vertical restraints to induce dealers to provide important sales services. 22 3
Proponents state that the purpose of vertical price fixing is not to raise con-
sumer prices but to increase output, which is economically efficient and
procompetitive.224 Permitting a manufacturer to set a resale price that pro-
vides the dealer with a high profit margin consequently induces the retailer
to invest in sales services225 in order to increase sales and realize higher
profit margins26 As a consequence, the manufacturer realizes both distrib-
utive and allocative efficiencies.2 27
Closely related to the sales services issue is the problem of discounters
"free riding" on the sales and promotion services of full price dealers.
228
222. In addition to motivating a dealer to provide sales services, eliminating the free rider
problem, and encouraging new dealer investment in product distribution, the arguments in
favor of vertical price fixing are that it protects small dealers, it permits a manufacturer to
preserve brand image, and it discourages the use of the product as a loss leader. See S.C.
OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON & J.T. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: CASES, TEXT
AND COMMENTARY, 540-44 (4th ed. 1981). But see Pitofsky, supra note 98, at 1491-94.
223. 108 S. Ct. at 1520.
224. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 8, at 397-405; R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTI-
TRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 211-15 (2d ed. 1981).
225. See Bork, supra note 8, at 397-405. Nonprice factors such as services are as important
an influence on demand and output as price. Proponents argue that growth in demand and
output attributable to the increased services would more than offset the decrease in demand
and output due to the higher retail price. Id.; see also R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra
note 224, at 211-15.
226. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 224, at 211-15. Proponents argue, how-
ever, that the cost of unrestrained service competition will dissipate additional profits to the
point where marginal cost equals price, resulting in maximum distributive efficiency. Id.
227. Id. Higher profit margins will induce dealers to increase sales services such as adver-
tising, promotion, and in-store demonstrations and displays. Id. These pre-sale services will,
in turn, increase sales by persuading more consumers to buy the product. Id. The increase in
economies of scale will reduce per-unit transaction and distribution costs, increasing distribu-
tive efficiencies. Id. Higher output will allow manufacturers to sell at a price closer to margi-
nal cost and achieve allocative efficiencies. Id. But see Scherer, supra note 98, at 697-705
(arguing that vertical restraints reduce efficiency where competitors' services cancel each other
out, where consumers have less choice, and where high prices attract entrants into a saturated
market); Comanor, supra note 98, at 988-98 (arguing that where all consumers do not demand
the same level of services, vertical restraints may not increase efficiency).
228. See Telser, supra note 216, at 91-92. Free riders are dealers that can sell products at
discounted prices because they allegedly do not incur the promotional costs associated with a
full service dealership. Id. The discounter "free rides" on the pre-sale services provided by
full service dealers. Id. Essentially, these pre-sale services persuade the customer to purchase
the product, but, instead of purchasing the product from the full service dealer at the higher
price, the customer purchases it from the discounter. Id. Since the customer can free ride on
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Proponents of vertical price fixing contend that free riding discourages deal-
ers from providing sales services.22 9 The free rider can sell at a lower price
and take sales away from full service dealers because the free rider does not
incur the high costs of sales services.23" By eliminating price competition,
vertical price fixing guarantees dealers the revenues to offset the expense of
additional sales services. Moreover, it reduces free riding by allowing manu-
facturers to either terminate free riders or refuse to supply them.
Opponents of vertical price fixing contend that these efficiencies and
procompetitive effects are merely theoretical benefits and that the anticom-
petitive effects are more pernicious than vertical price fixing proponents indi-
cate. First, they assert that the concept of the "free rider" has never been
empirically proven. 23 ' The generalization that discounters offer lower prices
because they fail to provide services is unfounded.23 2 Discounters often pro-
vide sales services that equal or exceed full price retailers' services.233 Thus,
it is more likely that discounters offer lower prices because they provide
these services more efficiently.23 4 Vertical price fixing, therefore, prevents
more efficient dealers from passing the benefits of their efficiencies to the
consumer through reduced retail prices.23 5
Second, vertical price fixing protects the inefficient manufacturer from
having to compete for dealers and sales on a price basis.2 36 Assuring the
dealer an adequate profit margin through vertically-fixed prices diminishes
the pressure on the manufacturer to reduce prices to dealers in a highly com-
petitive market. The manufacturer may simply terminate the discounter to
alleviate the pressure on the wholesale price.
the services of the other dealer, the discounter has no incentive to provide these services and
incur the costs. Id. Eventually, the full service dealer curtails its promotional services, injur-
ing the manufacturer by reducing sales, and the consumer by reducing competition. Continen-
tal T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977). See also Comanor, supra note 98,
at 987; Gerla, supra note 98, at 3. See generally sources cited supra note 8.
229. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (1988); Bork, supra
note 8, at 453-56; Baxter, supra note 8, at 21; see also Comanor, supra note 98, at 987.
230. Bork, supra note 8, at 453-56; Baxter, supra note 8, at 21; see also Comanor, supra
note 98, at 987.
231. Shores, Vertical Price-Fixing and the Contract Conundrum: Beyond Monsanto, 54
FORDHAM L. REV. 377, 401-04 (1985).
232. Gerla, supra note 98, at 4.
233. Id.
234. Pitofsky, supra note 98, at 1493; see also R. STEINER, infra note 249, at 3, 13-2 1. The
large markups of full price retailers are often due to inefficient operations and practices such as
poor space and labor utilization, excessive advertising, overcapacity, bundling of sales services
rather than charging for services based upon use, and high transaction and other overhead
costs. Gerla, supra note 98, at 4-5.
235. See Gerla, supra note 98, at 4-5.
236. Pitofsky, supra note 98, at 1490-91.
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Third, to the extent vertical price fixing induces services, it does so inef-
ficiently. 237 It does not guarantee the level or types of services that the man-
ufacturer desires or needs. In fact, it does not guarantee that the dealer will
provide any services at all. A services requirement in the dealer agreement
provides a more efficient and less restrictive means of assuring an appropri-
ate level and type of service from a dealer.238 The dealer's failure to supply
the contractually required services would result in a breach of the dealer
agreement and a justifiable termination of the violating dealer.
Inefficiencies also result from a system that removes the price/product/
service mix determination from the market. 239 The assumption that the
manufacturer knows better than the market the appropriate level and mix of
services, and the price that would achieve them, does not comport with the
lessons of competitive market economics. A system that allows consumers
to choose between different price/product/service mixes and gives the dealer
the flexibility to respond to these demands more efficiently allocates
resources.
24°
Finally, the argument that vertical price fixing eliminates the free rider
problem provides only weak justification. Because a vertical price fixing sys-
tem imposes no obligation to provide a certain level or type of service, a
dealer will always find it more profitable to "cheat" by reducing the level of
sales services it provides and riding free on the services of other dealers.24'
Again, a sales services provision in the dealer agreement more efficiently and
less restrictively assures that alleged free riders provide the level and type of
service that the manufacturer deems necessary.242
B. Attracting New Dealers to Invest in Distributing the Product
The Sharp Court noted that vertical restraints have the potential to induce
competent and aggressive retailers to invest in the capital and labor needed
to distribute a product more efficiently.243 Proponents of vertical price fixing
also advance this argument in support of their view. Vertical price fixing
237. Id. at 1493.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Halverson, supra note 180, at 64.
242. Id. The manufacturer structures the agreement with the dealer to assure that certain
services are provided in line with the manufacturer's promotional needs and the customer's
informational needs. Without a vertical price fixing agreement, the dealer has the flexibility to
adjust his price to a level that takes advantage of any efficiencies in the provision of these
services. Id.; see also Pitofsky, supra note 98, at 1493.
243. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1519-20; Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 55 (1977).
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provides an incentive, in the form of a higher profit margin, to attract new
dealers to invest in a product's distribution.2" Increasing the number of
dealers provides the consumer with more choice and more product informa-
tion, thereby increasing distributive efficiency and enhancing consumer
welfare.245
Opponents argue that vertical price fixing is not needed to attract new
dealers and may even reduce efficiency. 246 In a market characterized by low
sales and high demand potential, the manufacturer wants to attract new
dealers to invest in distribution in order to realize this potential. However,
allowing the manufacturer to raise the price to consumers to attract new
dealers generates considerable controversy.147 A more economically efficient
solution would compel a manufacturer to compete for new dealers by lower-
ing wholesale prices.
214
Opponents also contend that vertical price fixing hinders the expansion
and survival of new businesses. The survival of a new business often depends
on its ability to exploit any cost advantages by cutting prices in order to
attract and develop a customer base.2 49 Vertical price fixing removes pricing
discretion and, consequently, reduces the ability of new retailers to attract
customers. Eliminating price competition as a marketing strategy may con-
tribute to the demise of many new businesses.25 ° The high number of busi-
ness failures, the low rate of business start-ups, and high consumer prices
during the fair trade period demonstrate this potential.2 51
Attracting new dealers into a demand-saturated market may be inefficient.
Demand for the product does not increase, but instead shifts from one new
dealer to another. "Competitors' services simply cancel each other out" and
the dealers cannibalize each other's sales.25 2 In addition, as sales are reallo-
cated among more dealers in a saturated market, dealers lose economies of
244. See Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282,
283-85 (1975).
245. See R. BORK, supra note 8, at 288-91, 297-98.
246. See Pitofsky, supra note 98, at 1494; Scherer, supra note 98, at 704-05.
247. Pitofsky, supra note 98, at 1494.
248. Id.
249. See R. STEINER, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 14, 17-18
(Federal Trade Commission Working Paper No. 66, June 1982).
250. Hearings, supra note 13, at 105 (statement of Mr. Monroe G. Milstein, Chairman of
Burlington Coat Factory, citing 1975 Justice Department Study). See also S. REP. No. 466,
supra note 13, at 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1569, 1571-72.
251. See S. REP. No. 466, supra note 13, at 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1569, 1571-72.
252. Scherer, supra note 98, at 704.
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scale:2 53 Resources are allocated less efficiently when vertical price fixing
coaxes new dealers into a market where demand volume has reached its
maximum.
C. Vertical Price Fixing and Cartelization
The Sharp Court noted that vertical price fixing could reduce interbrand
competition by facilitating cartelization.254 However, it dismissed the carte-
lization issue because no evidence demonstrated the cartelizing effects of
nonprice restraints.2"5 In mischaracterizing the issue as a nonprice restraint,
the Court incorrectly disposed of the cartelization issue.
Commentators on both sides of the vertical price fixing debate recognize
the dangers that cartelization poses in a vertical price fixing environment.256
Proponents note, however, that a number of factors mitigate the dangers of
cartelization. First, a cartel is difficult to hold together. 257 Cartels are ex-
pensive and difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate and police.258 In addi-
tion, if entry into the market is relatively easy, vertical price restraints are
unlikely to facilitate cartelization" 9 Thus, a cartel will succeed only in
highly concentrated markets where a small number of manufacturers and
dealers account for most of the sales in the area.26°
Proponents also contend that the per se proscriptions against cartelization
or price fixing at the manufacturers' or dealers' levels provide adequate pro-
tection against cartelizing behavior. As the majority noted in Sharp, anti-
trust law focuses primarily on interbrand competition, not intrabrand
competition. 26' Because the per se proscription against horizontal price fix-
253. Id. at 704-05.
254. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1520.
255. Id.
256. Scherer, supra note 98, at 691-92. Proponents have noted this danger. Sharp, 108 S.
Ct. at 1520; Posner, supra note 244, at 294; GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 16-18. Opponents
of vertical price fixing have also recognized it. Halverson, supra note 180, at 6466; Pitofsky,
supra note 61, at 15-17.
257. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1521.
258. Id.
259. GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 16-18. Entry of new manufacturers and dealers would
undermine the cartel by cutting prices. Substitute products also put price pressure on cartels
unless the manufacturers of those substitutes also participate in the cartel. Id.
260. Id.
261. Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1520. Vertical restraints decrease intrabrand competition by re-
ducing the number of distributors of the same product in a particular location, restricting the
customers to whom a dealer may sell, requiring exclusive dealership arrangements, or by fixing
the price at which a dealer may resell the product. Proponents contend, however, that inter-
brand competition provides a significant check on the ability of the manufacturer or dealer to
exploit intrabrand market power due to the availability of competitors' products. See Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977).
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ing adequately protects interbrand competition, the per se rule against verti-
cal price fixing is not needed.
Opponents of vertical price fixing find these arguments unpersuasive. In
their view, permitting vertical price fixing would facilitate the creation and
stabilization of interbrand manufacturer cartels and, thereby, reduce inter-
brand competition. First, they argue that proponents of vertical price fixing
attach too much weight to the assumption that distribution markets are per-
fectly competitive.2 62 In general, interbrand competition is overestimated as
a check on cartelization. Brand or product imaging differentiates similar
products and reduces competition among these products.2 61 Manufacturers
may impose nonprice vertical restraints, such as territorial or customer re-
strictions or exclusive dealing arrangements, which effectively limit the
amount of interbrand as well as intrabrand competition. 2" They may like-
wise terminate dealers for non-compliance with these restraints. All of these
factors increase concentration in the market and facilitate cartelization.
Second, if the impetus for an action that promotes vertical price fixing
comes from a dealer, it is more likely that the purpose is to suppress price
competition, and its effect is to facilitate a cartel. 265 Even proponents of
vertical price fixing admit that the imposition of vertical restraints in re-
sponse to the demands or complaints of dealers is more likely to be anticom-
petitive and inefficient than those imposed based on the independent
judgment of a manufacturer.2 6 6 The manufacturer's independent decision to
impose vertical restraints more likely attempts to enhance distributive effi-
ciencies and increase output. 2 6 7 Dealers are more concerned with competi-
tion and profit margin than with distributive efficiencies,2 6' and their
complaints about discounting dealers are more likely intended to further a
269horizontal agreement. Where a complaint results in the termination of a
dealer, the restraint takes on the character of a horizontal restraint of trade
and should be classified as such regardless of the number of parties involved
in the boycott. 270 In determining whether a particular restraint of trade is
262. Gerla, supra note 98, at 18.
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 61, at 27-38 (arguing that vertical restrictions other than
vertical price fixing can be highly anticompetitive and reduce the ability of discounters to
compete); Gerla, supra note 98, at 16, 23-25 (certain vertical restraints are as damaging to
competition as vertical price fixing).
265. Campbell & Ware, Russell Stover and the Vertical Agreement Puzzle, 52 ANTITRUST
L.J. 83, 89 (1989); see also Pitofsky, supra note 98, at 1490-91.
266. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 148, 165 (1976).
267. Id.
268. Campbell & Ware, supra note 265, at 89.
269. Id. at 89.
270. Gerla, supra note 98, at 9-10.
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unreasonable, the substance and effect of the restraint should carry more
weight than its form.
Finally, manufacturers organizing and enforcing dealer cartels diminish
pressure on their own wholesale prices and therefore, stabilize interbrand
manufacturer cartels.27 ' Retail prices are much more visible and public and
can be used by manufacturers as a measure of their competitors' compliance
with a cartel agreement.27 2 Providing dealers with a guaranteed return
reduces the pressure on a manufacturer to lower prices, reduces incentives to
become more efficient and, thus, facilitates cartelization and fosters ineffi-
cient behavior.2 73 Price competition is reduced and nonprice factors such as
services, advertising, and promotion take over, creating an illusion of intense
competition.
V. CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSAL TO CODIFY THE PER SE STANDARD
Congressional concern about the impact of the Monsanto decision on pri-
vate vertical price fixing actions resulted in the House of Representatives'
passage of the Freedom from Vertical Price Fixing Act2 74 of 1987. That
same year, the Senate Judiciary Committee passed the Retail Competition
Enforcement Act2 75 of 1987 and submitted it to the Senate for approval.
Neither bill passed in the 100th Congress, but both were reintroduced in the
101st Congress.2 76 The measure2 7 7 would amend the Sherman Antitrust
Act and, as proposed, would accomplish several purposes.
First, the proposal would codify the per se rule against vertical price fix-
ing. It would make clear that all forms of vertical price fixing are illegal, and
evidence of an agreement on a specific price or price levels would not be
required to prove a vertical price fixing conspiracy.2 78 Thus, a court would
Whether a boycott is implemented by a single competitor or a group of competitors
should make no difference in the treatment of the tactic under the antitrust laws. A
boycott sponsored by a single, influential competitor can be just as devastating to a
discounter and the competition it provides as can a boycott sponsored by a group of
competitors.
Id. at 10. The suppression of competition by an illegal act is the essence of a section 1 Sherman
Act violation. Nowhere does the Act require a minimum number of parties for the illegal
conduct to constitute a violation of section 1. Id.
271. See Pitofsky, supra note 61, at 16-17.
272. See Shores, supra note 231, at 402-03.
273. See Pitofsky, supra note 61, at 16-17.
274. H.R. 585, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
275. S. 430, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
276. See supra note 171.
277. Because both laws would accomplish the same purposes, this Note analyzes the House
of Representative's version.
278. H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 38. In codifying the per se standard, Congress
would unequivocally affirm its support of the standard and reject as a matter of legislative
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find a violation of the Sherman Act where a manufacturer and supplier con-
spired either to fix or maintain prices, to restrict another dealer's ability to
determine his resale price, or to terminate or cut off supply to a price-cut-
ter."' The proscription would be absolute, covering all activity designed "to
restrain price movement and the free play of market forces." 280
Second, the revised measure would reverse the Monsanto and Sharp evi-
dentiary standard. It would properly return to the trier of fact the task of
determining whether a set of facts indicates the existence of concerted action
or agreement.2 ' Specifically, the jury would determine whether the plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to infer a contract, combination, or conspiracy
to set, change, or maintain prices in violation of the Sherman Act.28 2 The
plaintiff would not be required to present evidence sufficient to show an ex-
plicit agreement on prices or price levels in order to reach the jury.283
Third, the measure details the type of evidence that would be sufficient to
meet the new evidentiary standard; that is, a communication between a man-
ufacturer and a dealer regarding price competition.284 Under the proposed
statute, to reach the trier of fact the plaintiff must show only the existence of
price communications. It defines a price communication as any express or
implied threat, suggestion, request, or demand from the manufacturer or
rival dealer that the plaintiff discontinue price competition. 285 Moreover,
the statute would require the plaintiff to show that the termination or refusal
to supply was "in response to" such demands or threats from the supplier.286
A termination "following" a complaint would not imply causation.287
policy "recent efforts to qualify, trivialize, or dilute the breadth of the RPM (resale price main-
tenance) stricture." Id. The new version of section 2 would reverse the impact of the Sharp
decision by deeming vertical price fixing agreements illegal per se whether or not a specific
price level is agreed upon. See H.R. 1236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
279. H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 38. The bill attempts to eliminate the "artful"
blurring of the distinction between nonprice and price restraints, currently practiced by some
courts and the administration, by concentrating on the purpose and effect of the conduct. Id.
at 38-39. That is, if the purpose and effect of the conduct is to stifle price competition in any
manner, then vertical price fixing is implicated and the per se rule would apply. Id. at 39.
280. Id. (quoting Cernuto v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 1979)).
281. Id. at 31-32.
282, Id. Communications between manufacturers and dealers concerning price competi-
tion that result in the termination of the price cutter, would constitute a sufficient showing of
causation to reach a jury. The plaintiff need not disprove that the manufacturer acted indepen-
dently. Id.
283. See supra note 278.
284. H.R. REP. No. 421, supra note 15, at 26-27, 31.
285. Id. at 34-35.
286. Id. at 31. "In response to" a complaint implies a causal relation to the price commu-
nication. Id.
287. Id.
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Finally, the plaintiff would be required to convince the trier of fact that
these demands or threats were the major or substantial contributing cause of
its termination.2 88 If such evidence was available, the court would be re-
quired to present the issue to the jury.28 9
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Sharp Court left the per se rule against vertical price fixing
intact, it continued the trend of the Court's holdings in Sylvania and Mon-
santo, by narrowing the scope of the absolute prohibitions against vertical
restraints. By adopting the Chicago School and Reagan administration posi-
tion that vertical restraints are procompetitive and efficiency enhancing the
Court has effectively repudiated the Congressional position on vertical price
fixing, and has quite likely set the stage for overturning Dr. Miles. The
Court's commitment to the holding of Dr. Miles appears to rest solely on the
doctrine of stare decisis.
The legal and economic impact of Sharp is predictable. Discounters have
much less legal protection against collusive termination. Sharp has further
reduced the likelihood of bringing a successful vertical price fixing action
and, therefore, will result in an increase in dealer terminations.
Economic experience proves that vertical price fixing results in higher
prices to the consumer. However, no empirical evidence demonstrates that
higher prices result in better sales services. The Sharp decision rests solely
on an economic theory propounded by the Chicago School and supported by
the Reagan administration. Nothing in the Sharp holding guarantees that
the quantity or quality of consumer sales services will improve after Sharp.
If a manufacturer determines that the provision of sales services would in-
crease output, a dealer contract would provide a much less restrictive means
to secure the services from the retailer. Vertical price fixing is an economi-
cally inefficient means of inducing these services and, except for a few well
defined exceptions, it is purely a means of transferring wealth from consum-
ers to manufacturers and dealers.
The proposed amendment to the Sherman Act offers the only means of
assuring that consumers and discounters will be protected from the real and
damaging consequences of a practice affording only illusory benefits. Con-
gress should act to preserve competition that will benefit both consumers
288. Id. at 33. The evidentiary burden has been equated to a "but for" causation test such
that de minimis or immaterial causation does not raise an inference. Id. at 33-34.
289. Id. at 32. Such evidence would be sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judge-
ment, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. However, the defendant is
not precluded from submitting evidence that rebuts the plaintiff's evidence and thereby obtain
a summary judgment, directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 32-33.
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and manufacturers in the long run by making manufacturers more competi-
tive and efficient. Although antitrust laws protect competition, not competi-
tors, Congress must act to protect a certain class of competitors, the
discounters. If no action is taken to protect discounters, competition will
certainly be reduced, resulting in higher prices and lower output.
Dennis 0. Doherty
